PART II: From the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas (Ia qq. 27-43)

On the procession of the Divine Persons (q. 27) [ch. 1]

- A.1. *Whether there is procession in God?*
  - Processions in God are by intellectual emanation of an intelligible word from Him who enunciates rather than by local motion or transitive action, neither which apply to God.
    - Procession points to the origin of one from another, but unlike human generation, divine processions possess no imperfections, as the divine nature *remains numerically the same* allowing only for a distinction in persons arising from opposition of relation.
  - Both Arius and Sabellius erred because they understood the procession in God as being *ad extra* rather than *ad intra*.
    - Since God is above all things, whatever is predicated of Him is understood in resemblance to intellectual and not corporeal substances.
      - In intellectual substances, procession is after the manner of action *ad intra,* as the concept of a thing or the mental word proceeds from the intellect; this is what occurs in God.
    - Against Arius, in God there is no procession of effect from cause, or else the Son and Holy Ghost would not be God, which is contrary to 1 Jn 5:20 and 1 Cor 6:19.
    - Against Sabellius, in God procession is not to be understood as though there were different effects flowing from one and the same person of the Father (e.g., the Son is the Father in reference to the Incarnation); the contrary would contradict Jn 5:19 which establishes a difference between the Father and the Son.
  - *ad 1*: Procession would imply motion in God if it were after the manner of transitive action; however, in God, procession follows upon immanent action which is in the predicament of *quality* and not *action*.
  - *ad 2*. Numerical diversity of the divine nature would occur if the procession was *ad extra* (as in man, a son proceeds from a father with a human nature numerically distinct).
    - Whatever proceeds *ad intra* Py intelligible process need not be diverse; the more perfect the procession, the more perfect that which proceeds will be one with that which it proceeds.
    - The more profoundly something is understood, the more intimate the intellectual concept be to him who understands and thus the more perfect the union of concept and comprehensor.
    - As God's intellection is most perfect, the Word must be perfectly united with Him from whom He proceeds without any numerical diversity, leaving only a distinction in persons.
  - *ad 3:* Procession *ad intra* is not repugnant to God as the first principle since it does not admit of numerical diversity of divine nature, which is impossible.
- A.2. *Whether any procession in God can be called generation?*
  - The procession of the Word in God is called *generation,* and the Word that proceeds is called the Son; the Nicene Creed defines the Son not to b made, but begotten from the substance of the Father, and thus is called the *natural* Son of the Father and not adopted.
  - The sense of generation and its application to God:
    - Generation is the origin of one living being from a conjoined living principle in the likeness of nature (e.g, man begets man).
      - In the natural created order, generation entails a reduction from potency to act, of non-being to being producing a numerically distinct nature; this is repugnant to God's operations *ad intra*.
      - Generation in God must possess no imperfections or transition from potency to act; hence, an *analogy oppropert proportionality must be admitted to apply the term to God*.
    - In the *formal* sense, all that is required of generation is the origin of a living being from a living being of the same nature.
      - The procession of the Word after the manner of intellection fits this formal sense because the concept in the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood.
      - In God, since the Father understands and enunciates Himself, *a nature that is numerically the same is communicated,* because in God being and intellection are identical.
      - Moreover, in God alone, understanding and mental concept are substantial, not accidental as in us (since for us, a word proceeds from us as an accident in which is *represented* the substance of the thing understood, not the substance itself).
        - Hence *in God,* the Word proceeds as the subsistence of the same divine nature and is therefore said properly to be begotten and Son; He is not only God as understood, but true God from true God.
    - The most perfect intellect (God) assimilates its Word most perfectly, both intentionally and *really* in nature, in a nature that is numerically one.

- Thus the divine Word is indeed substantial, living, and understanding; in God, *being, understanding,* and *being understood* are identical.
- As the divine generation of the Word is eternal (due to the divine nature), it follows that in the ever-present *nowoi* eternity, the Father always begets the Son and the Son is always bom; the divine generation takes place without any newness of being.
- Paternity and begetting are not properly called simple perfections, or else some perfection would be denied to the Son and thus He would not be God.; the divine relations do not add any relative perfections that would be virtually distinct from the absolute perfection of the divine essence.

- *ad 3:* The being of the Word is *accepted* but not *received* since it is self-subsisting being itself.
- *ad 4'.* Hie Father's enunciation differs only by reason from the essential intellection common to the Persons and is not really distinct from the divine essence.
  - Since there is no motion in God, the personal action that proceeds a person is nothing else than the relation of a principle to a person who is from the principle; these relations are the actual divine relations and no difference exists between them except in manner of speaking.

A.3. *Whether any otherprocession exists in God other than that ofthe Word?*

- In God, procession takes place according to immanent and not transient act; intellectual nature (such as God) possesses two immanent acts, those being intellection and volition (love).
- Thus in God, it is appropriate that there be a procession of love in addition to the intellectual procession, as love of die good follows upon conception of the good.
- *ad 7:* An infinity of divine processions cannot be admitted, since the procession ad intra in intellectual natures terminates by the procession of the will.
- *ad 2:* There is no parity between created nature and uncreated nature, so thus *whatever is in God is God,* which is hardly the case with created natures,
  - Hence, the divine nature is communicated by any procession that is not *ad extra,* and this is the case with the procession of the Word or of love.

A.4. *Whether the procession oflove in God is generation?*

- The Atlianasian creed maintains that the procession of the Holy Ghost is not the same as begetting or generation.
- In its formal sense, generation takes place after the manner of assimilation of the begotten to the begetter, and such assimilation takes place in procession from the intellect.
  - Such assimilation is not proper to die will, for by its own power it is not assimilative and does not assimilate a thing to itself, but rather it inclines towards the thing that is willed (in reference to the good).
  - Thus the procession which is not generation remains without a special name; it is called *spiration* at times because it refers to the procession of the Holy Ghost.

A.5. *Whether there are more than twoprocessions in God?*

- Holy Writ and the definitions by the Church maintain that there are three divine Persons, one that does not proceed and two others that proceed, thus showing that there are only two processions in God, no more and no less.
- In every intellectual nature, there are only two immanent actions, intellect and will; the divine nature as good is self-diffusive tiirough the intellectual procession and through the procession of love, inasmuch as God understands and loves His essence, truth, and goodness.
- *ad 1:* It is *not the divine nature* that generates or spirates, but it is the Father who is the *principium quod* of generation, and it is the Father and Son who are the *principum quod* of spiration.
  - If the divine nature generated, then the generation would be in the three Persons and the three Persons would generate, and thus the Holy Ghost would generate a fourth person and so on to infinity.
- *ad 2:* In regard to the *principium quo* of each procession:
  - Each procession terminates with one person who proceeds not from the dirtine nature taken in itself, but the Son proceeds from the divine nature as it is of the Father (who generates) and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the divine nature as it is in the Father and Son (who spirate)
  - Thus the *principium quo* of each procession actively considered is the intellect and will in the divine nature *as modified by the relation* of paternity- and active spiration. (N.B. *as modified* is important because intellection and will are essential to all three).
- *ad 4:.* Generation and spiration in God are purely and simply immanent actions above the order of causality; thus through them the divine nature is not caused but communicated.
  - There is no distinction between the Father and Son (and Holy Ghost) except through the distinction of origin; thus all are identical in nature, dignity, omnipotence, and the like (cf. In 16:15).

On the Divine Relations (q. 28) [ch.2]

- A.1 *Whether then are real relations in God?*
  - The condemnation of Sabellius involved the definition of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be really distinct; the Father is so-called only because of His paternity' (a relation), the Son because of His filiation (a relation), and the Holy Ghost because of passive spiration (yet another relation).
    - Again, the Father is so-called with relation to the Son, and the Son with relation to the Father, and in this way are the two Persons really distinguished by the opposition of relation.
    - Council of Florence (cf. Denz. 703): *In God all things are one where there is no opposition of relation.*
  - The processions in God take place in the identity of nature, and thus that which proceeds and that from which it proceeds should concur in the same order and have real references to each other; hence a real relation exists between the Father and the Son and the Son and the Father.
    - This is easily demonstrated as well if we consider anything proceeding from God *ad extra* (creatures); since the creature is obviously not of the same order as God, the two are not mutually ordered to each other.
    - Only the creature is ordered and dependent upon God, and thus a real relation exists only from the creature to God and not vice-versa.
  - *ad 3:* It is in the nature of creatures to depend on God, but not in God's nature to depend on creatures; however, the Father and Son are of the same order and are ordered to each other.
- A.2. *Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?*
  - The relations in God are not really distinct from the divine essence, but are distinguished from it only by way of reason.
    - Everything that is not the divine nature is a creature; if the relations are not the divine essence, then they are creatures, which is false since the relations really belong to God and are worshipped with *latria.*
    - As God is pure Act, there can be no accident perfecting something potential and perfectible; thus any relation in God will be substantial and thus not really distinct from the divine essence.
      - Hence, the relation of paternity in God is distinguished only by reason since it expresses a reference to something else, namely of the Father to the Son.
  - *ad 1:* In God, there are only two predicaments, substance and relation, and here relation falls in the realm of the substantial.
  - *ad 2:* The correct concept of God in our minds actually and implicitly contain the relations in Him.
    - The Deity as known by us contains the divine relations implicitly; the Deity as it is in itself contains them explicitly (or formally) and eminently.
    - The divine relations are in God like the divine attributes, to a greater degree than as all the colors are contained in white, since the colors are contained only virtually and not formally (e.g., white is not blue); however, the Deity is true, good, etc., and is also the paternity, although the divine nature is communicated from the Father to the Son without a communication of paternity.
- A.3. *Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?*
  - In God, a real distinction exists between the relations opposed to each other.
    - The nature of a real relation consists in the reference of one thing to another, according to which something is relatively opposed to another and the two are really distinct.

OPPOSITION

- BETWEEN BEING AND NON-BEING
  - BY PURE NEGATION (contradictory) = man and no man
  - BY PRIVATION IN SUITABLE SUBJECT (privative) = sight and blindness
- BETWEEN BEING AND BEING
  - BY EXPELLING EACH OTHER FROM SUBJECT (contrary)= virtue/vice
  - BASED ON MUTUAL REFERENCE (relative) = father and son

Relative opposition is the weakest kind of opposition, since one extreme does not destroy the other, but rather, one requires the other.

- Only this kind of opposition can be applied to God since it implies no privation, but only a distinction with a reference (cf. Aquinas *De Potentia* q.7 a.8 ad 4).
- Relative opposition can be defined as the repugnance of two things arising from the fact that they refer to each other.

- *ad 7*: Divine relations are equal and identical to the divine essence *actually* and not mentally; although there may be mutual opposition between the relation, no opposition occurs between the relation and the divine essence (e.g., transitive action and passion are the same as movement, but are really distinct from each other by relative opposition, as action is the movement coming from the agent and passion is the action as received in the recipient).

  In God, there is one Being the relations do not make a composition within the essence while they really distinguish the Persons; thus in the three divine Persons there is equal glory, one divinity, and the same absolute perfections.

A.4. *Whether in God there are only four real relations: paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?*

- There exists only four real relations in God, which are founded upon action and passion.

  In God, there are only two actions *ad intra,* intellection and love, from which the two processions derive. Each procession is the basis for two relations, the principle of the procession and that proceeding from the principle.

  Thus in God there exists relations of paternity, filiation (founded on intellection), and active and passive spiration (founded on love).

  Active spiration is not distinct from the persons of the father and the Son because it is not opposed to them (thus the Holy Ghost proceeds *from both,* thus there are three relations that are opposed to each other, and there are three persons and not four.

On the Divine Persons (q.29) [ch.3]

- A.1. *The definition of person",* (cf. Ludwig Ott, *Fundamentals,* Part I, sec. 17)
  - The concepts of essence, nature, and substance characterize the physical essence of God common to the three Persons, that is, the totality of the divine perfections of essence.
  - Hypostasis pertains to *an individual complete substance existing entirely for itself,* the person is *a hypostasis endowed with reason (hence, an individual substance with a rational nature).*

    Hypostasis and nature comport themselves to each other in such a manner that the hypostasis *is the bearer of the nature and the ultimate subject of all being and acting* (principium quod), while the nature *is that through which the hypostasis is and acts* (principium quo).

    Personality is *that by which a free and intelligent subject is what it is,* namely, that which determines an individual nature to be immediately capable of existing.

A.2. *Whether the term* person *is the same as* hypostasis, subsistence, *and* essence? (cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1,4,10)

- In the genus of rational substances, the term *person* signifies what the terms *hypostasis, substance,* and *res naturae* signify in the whole genus of substances, namely the *suppositum* (unified whole;.

CONCRETE TERMS		ABSTRACT TERMS
person	corresponds to	personality
suppositum	corresponds to	subsistence
subsisting in itself	corresponds to	existence of the substance
inhering	corresponds to	existence of the accident

A.3. *Whether the word* person *should be said of God?*

- *Person* can be applied to God, as it is clear from the Athanasian Creed that *there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost* (cf. Lateran fV).
- Since *person* signifies that which is most perfect in all nature, that is, a subsistence with a rational or intellectual nature, it is proper that this term be used with reference to God *analogically,* and in the most excellent manner.

  God is subsisting being itself with an intellectual nature and, therefore, whatever pertains to the person belongs to Him formally and eminently.
- *ad 2.* The term *person* in its formal meaning most properly belongs to God since the dignity of the divine nature exceeds even dignity.
- *ad 4'.* Individual being belongs to God only so far as individual being denotes incommunicability; hence the person of the Father is incommunicable to the Son, and, in reference to the Incarnate Word, the humanity of Christ is not a person because it is communicated to the suppositum of the Word in which it exists (i.e., Christ is a divine person with a human nature).

A.4. *Whether the word person signifies relation?*

- The divine person signifies relation as subsisting, for in God all things are one and the same except where there is opposition of relation.

  Person in general signifies an individual (distinct) substance with an intellectual nature; *in God, then is no nal distinction except according to relations of origin, which are subsisting* (cf. la q.27).

        - In general, there are two things in the person: 1) the distinction of incommunicability (I, you, he), and; 2) subsistence in the intellectual nature; these are only found in God in reference to the real relations mutually opposed and thus really distinct and wholly subsisting.
        - Therefore in God, person signifies relation not as relation (or else it would be accidental) but *as subsisting,* the signified relation is included indirectly in the meaning of the divine person, which is *nothing else than a subsisting being in the divine essence distinct by relation* (that is, subsistence distinct by relation in the divine nature), (cf. *De potentia* q.9 a.4)
        - Thus the three divine Persons are three intelligent and free subjects, although they understand by the same essential intellection, love themselves by the same essential love (due to their unified divine nature), and freely love creatures by the same free act of love.
    - *ad 1:* The term *person* in God refers to Himself as subsisting, e.g., the Father as subsisting refers to Himself although *as relation* He refers to the Son.
    - *ad 4:* If the divine persons were distinguished by something other than opposite subsisting relations, they would differ in essence and by essence, which is impossible.

On the plurality of persons in God (q.30) [ch. 4]

- A.1. *Whether there are several persons in God?*
    - In God, there are several persons because there are several real subsisting relations opposed to one another, those being paternity, filiation, and passive spiration.
    - *ad 4:* All the relations are one according to essence and being, and all the relations are not greater than one alone; nor are all the persons greater than one alone since the entire infinite perfection of the divine nature is in each of the persons.
        - The divine nature is not multiplied in the three persons just as the surface is not multiplied in the three angles of a triangle; thus the three angles are not more than one angle alone.
- A.2. *Whether there are more than three persons in God?*
    - The divine persons are constituted by the three mutually opposing subsisting relations, those being paternity, filiation, and passive spiration; thus paternity and filiation are opposed to each other, and passive spiration opposed to the active spiration common to the Father and the Son.
- A.3. *Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?*
    - The numeral terms (e.g, *three* persons) do not add anything positive to God since they express not a quantitative (accidental!) but a transcendental plurality.
    - In God, there is a simple unity (unity of the divine nature) and a transcendental plurality (the plurality of the opposing relations).
        - In a nature numerically one and the same, the plurality arises from opposition of relations of origin, and therefore as the nature is not multiplied, it cannot be said that there are three gods but one God.
        - God is said to be triune in order to safeguard the simple unity which is at the same time substantial together with the plurality that arises from the opposing relations.
            - This is best compared *analogically* with the plurality of accidents within a subject, for example, as the plurality of faculties within one supposit.
- A.4. *Whether this term* person *can be common to the three Persons?*
    - That which constitutes a *person* is common to the three persons, that is, a subsisting relation opposed to other relations; however, it is not common to the three persons by a community of the actual thing (as is the divine essence, which is one).
    - If something were common to the three Persons actually, then there would only be one person as there is one nature.
    - *ad 3:* The term person is common to the three persons by a community· of reason and not actually, and it is not common by way of genus because the three persons have one being and are subsisting being itself which is above all genera.

On what belongs to the unity and plurality in God (q.31) [ch. 5]

- A.1. *Whether there is Trinity in God?*
    - Difficulty here arises from the fact that everything that is triune is threefold, whereas God is not threefold since He possesses the greatest unity.
    - *Trinity* can be applied to God, first because it is an article of faith, and second, because as there is transcendental plurality in God, the term Trinity· according to revelation limits this plurality^ to the three persons.

- *ad 1:* *Trinity* signifies at the same time the number of persons and the runty of essence, so it cannot be said that the Father is the Trinity.
- *ad 2:* 1 Jn 5:7 reads: *And these three are one,* giving rise to the name *Trinity.*
- *ad 3:* If God was said to be threefold (that is, triplicity which denotes a proportion of inequality), the three persons would be more than one alone, and one person would not have infinite perfection.
  - In reference to the persons and procession, we can say that each is threefold and twofold, respectively, because by addingtynw/ and *procession* multiplicity of nature is excluded.
- *ad 4:* *Unity in Trinity* denotes one nature in three persons, and *Trinity in Unity* signifies three persons in one nature.
- *ad 5:* The Trinity itself cannot be said to be threefold, for this would mean that there are three supposits of the Trinity; it is the case that there are three supposits of the *divine nature,* but not the Trinity.
  - It is correct to say that there are three persons or three hypostases in God, but not three individuals because the nature is multiplied in individuals.

	FORMALLY – personality		FORMALLY = nature
PERSON		INDIVIDUAL	
	MATERIALLY = nature		MATERIALLY = personality

  - Hence we do not say three individuals (formally), because the three persons are numerically one in nature.

A.2. *Whether the Son is other than the Father?*
- This difficulty arises from our Lord's words *I and the Father are one,* the Greed declares the Father and the Son to be consubstantial, that is, each is not another being but that which is the Father (divine nature) is the Son (and similarly for the Holy Ghost).
- The Son and the Father are one; the Son is not another (act of) being, although He is other than the Father because He was begotten by the Father.
  - Against Arianism, it is important to use the word *distinct m* reference to the Persons, rather than *diverse* (which implies a distinction in genus) or *difference* (which implies a distinction in species); hence the nature is not divided into three persons causing a disparity and making the Son alien to the Father.
  - Against Sabellianism, God is not said to be *unique, singular, or solitary,* but *one in threepersons.*

A.3. *Whether the exclusive word* alone *should be added to the essential term in God?*
- Alone is taken in two senses:
  - *Categorimaticalty or absolutely, meaning solitude.* God is not alone in this sense because that would mean that He is solitary and without any consort, denying the society of the divine persons.
  - *Syncategorimaticalty, denoting order ofpredicate to subject.* God is alone in this sense, in that God alone is eternal, His own being, and to Him alone belongs honor and praise.

A.4. *Whether an exclusive diction can bejoined to thepersonal term?*
- The Father is not alone absolutely because He is not solitary; syncategorimatically, it can be said that the Father alone enunciates or begets (or is Unbegotten).

On the knowledge of the divine persons (q.32) [ch. 6]

- A.1. *Whether the Trinity ofdivine Persons can be known by natural reason?*
  - The Trinity of divine Persons cannot be known by natural reason, that is, it cannot be understood or demonstrated:
    - *From the authority ofHoly Writ.* Mt 11:27, *No one knows the Son but the Father,* clearly indicates that the Trinity of divine Persons is above created natural know ledge, even that of angels;
      - Mt 16:17, *Blessed areyou Simon Bar-Jona,* although referring to the Incarnation which is a mystery above natural reason, supports the argument since the Trinity is all the more above natural reason.
    - *From the authority ofthe Fathers:* Ml the Fathers are constant on this account.
    - *From the authority ofthe Church:* Vatican I states that *the mysteries hidden in God anproposedfor our beliefand ifthey had not been divinely revealed they could not be known... [ffhese divine mysteries by their very nature exceed the created intellect.* (Denz. 1795ff)
    - *Theologicalproof*
      - We can know nothing about God naturally except through created effects and natural principles which are known from a consideration of created being, (cf. la q.l a.6; q.12 aa. 4,12)
      - Knowledge of the Trinity cannot be arrived at from natural created effects since these effects proceed from the creative power of God's omnipotence, which is common to the entire Trinity and pertains to the unity of the essence and not the distinction of persons.

- Furthermore, even if God's created effects were perfectly known by the intellect, it only leads to knowledge of the cause under the aspect by which it proceeds from the cause and according to the effect's dependence upon the cause.
    - Created effects depend upon God as He is one and not triune (e.g., painting makes known the painter, but it does not reveal whether the painter is fat, short, etc.).
- Thus, it is impossible to come to knowledge of the Trinity· by die light of natural reason alone.

- *ad 7*: The ancient philosophers did not know a Trinity· of persons, but the attributes which were later attributed to the persons.
- *ad 2:* Reason can only offer non-demonstrative arguments concerning the Trinity; even though our intellect produces a word, we cannot prove there to be a Word in God, since our word is a result of a need and in God His Word is from superabundance.
- *ad 3:* Revelation of the Trinity· confirms the truth of the natural order:
    - *It establishes that God did not create out of necessity of nature or knowledge',* as He is already fecund in Himself (as all tilings were made through His Word), He did not need to create in order to be fecund.
    - *It leads to a correct understanding of the salvation of man,* as atonement was made to the Father by way of the Incarnate Word and by· the gift of the Holy Ghost (Christ had to atone to somebody, not Himself).©

A.2. *Whether there are notions in God?*

- It is necessary· to express the relations in God in the abstract, and these relations in the abstract are called *personal properties* or *notions.*
    - In reference to their simplicity, divine things are designated by abstract terms; in reference to their subsistence, divine things are designated by concrete terms (e.g., God and Deity, wisdom and wise man, paternity· and Father), (cf. la q.3 a.3 adl; q.13 a.l)
    - Thus, paternity is the notion of the Father, filiation the notion of the Son, and procession (passive spiration) the notion of the Holy Ghost.
- Recourse to abstract notions is due to the intellect's apprehension of God, not as He is in Himself, but according to our method of knowing sensible things; simple forms of sensible things are signified by abstract terms (e.g. humanity) whereas a supposit is signified by concrete terms (e.g., //«.finany

A.3. *Whether there are five notions?*

- A notion is that which is the proper reason for knowing a divine person; as the divine persons are multiplied according to their origin (both passive and active), it is according to origin (active and passive) that the notions denoting the persons are derived.
    - Thus five notions, no more and no less, are arrived at, those being paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration, and innascibility, which pertains to the Father who is not only known by paternity, but by the fact that He is Unbegotten and is the principle without a principle.
    - Of the five notions, only four are relations, since innascibility is not a relation but the negation of the relation of origin in the Father.
    - Only four of the notions are properties, since active spiration belonging to the Father and Son is not a property.
    - Only three of the five notions are personal (constituting persons), since active spiration and innasciblity are not personal (this will be shown later).

A.4. *Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions?*

- This article was written because the Greeks held other opinions about active spiration which led to their denial of the *Filioque* (Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son).
- It is lawful to possess other opinions of the notions provided no conclusions are reached that are contrary to the Faith as proposed by the Church.

On the person of the Father (q.33) [ch.7]

A.l. Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?

- Florence defined the Father to be *the principle without principle.* (Denz. 703)
- A principle is nothing other than that from which something proceeds, and it is not necessarily the *cause* of the thing proceeding (e.g., line proceeds from an initial point, sequence of numbers proceeds from unity).
    - As the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father, in God it is clear that the Father is the principle of them.
- *ad 7*: The meaning of principle is more general than cause (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5,1), for cause implies a diversity of substance and dependence of one to another, whereas this is not implied by principle; thus just as a point is the principle and not the cause of a line, so the Father is the principle and not the cause of the Son.

- *ad 2:* The Son is said to be a principle from a principle (e.g, Light from Light), and the Holy Ghost is similar in His own way; the Father and the Son possess subsisting being itself, yet the Father communicates this being to the Son, and both the Father and Son to the Holy Ghost.
- *ad 3:* In its *formal significance* (rather than material or colloquial), principle does not denote priority but *origin.*
  - In God, there exists a relation of origin without priority, neither in time (because the processions are eternal) nor nature (because the divine nature is numerically the same in all three persons and the relations are not conceived without their opposing relations (paternity and filiation)).
  - In God, dignity is absolute and pertains to essence; so the same dignity and essence which is paternity in the Father is also filiation in the Son
    - In the Father, this dignity is in relation to the giver; in the Son, it is in relation to the receiver.
    - Receiving infinite and subsisting being in itself is not something less perfect than giving it; hence the term principle notionally belongs to the Father.

- A.2. *Whether the name* Father *is properly the name of a divine person?*
  - The name *Father is* properly used of the First Person and not the others, since the proper name of any person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from the others; the Father is distinguished by paternity.
  - *ad 1:* Relations in God are subsisting although *Father is* a name of a relation, it can be constitutive of a person.
  - *ad 3:* The divine Word is the substantial mental concept of the Father and is properly called Son; hence the Father is so-called properly and not metaphorically.
- A.3. *Whether this name* Father *is applied to God firstly as a personal name?*
  - In God, the name *Father is* used primarily in its personal meaning, rather than essentially:
    - It is used *personally* from all eternity and necessarily with relation to the only-Begotten Son, and *essentially* with temporal relation to creatures which were freely created.
    - The perfect example of paternity and filiation is found in the Father and the Son, whose nature is numerically one.
  - God is called essentially the Father of intellectual creatures according to their participation in the divine nature in the likeness of grace and glory.
- A.4. *Whether it is proper to the Father to be Unbegotten?*
  - Innascibility (being Unbegotten) is the property of the Father since the Father is the principle without principle and is known by the fact that He is not from another.
  - *ad 1*: Primary and simple things are denoted by negations, as when we say that a point is that which has no parts.
  - *ad 2:* Improperly, one can say that the Holy Ghost is unbegotten since He does not proceed by generation; properly however, being Unbegotten only pertains to the Father as the principle without a principle whereas the Son is a principle from a principle and the Holy Ghost the principle from both Persons.
  - *ad 3:* Unbegotten implies the negation of passive generation; this negation bestows a great dignity, since it implies the Father being the origin of the other Persons which is something positive.
    - Christ's prayers that address the Father personally frequently insist that all tilings have been given to the Son by the Father (cf. Jn 17:1-5).

On the person of the Son (q.34) [ch. 8]

- A.1. *Whether* Word *in God is a personal name?*
  - In God, the name *Word,* if used in its proper meaning is a personal and not an essential name.
    - The *Word* sigiifies something proceeding from another, as a concept of the mind; that which signifies something proceeding from another in God is personal since the divine persons are distinguished by their origin.

		1 **THE INTERIOR CONCEPT OF THE MIND**
	PROPERLY	2. THE IMAGINATION OF THE SOUL TO BE EMITTED
WORD		3. THE SOUND WHICH SIGNIFIES THE MENTAL CONCEPT
	IMPROPERLY	THAT WHICH IS SIGNFIED BY THE WORD, NOT THE SIGN, BUT ITS MEANING

In God, *Word* is used *properly only in the first sense,* as an interior concept of the mind; as whatever is in God is God, so His Word is therefore also substantial.

- *ad* 2: In God, intellection is predicated essentially and belongs to the three persons.
- *ad 3:* In God, enunciation is predicated personally; only the Father enunciates, the Son alone is enunciated as the Word, and three Persons understand.

- A.2. *Whether Word is the Son's proper name?*
  - The JFon/is the proper name of the Son because word signifies a certain emanation from the intellect, and the Son alone proceeds after the manner of an emanation from the intellect.
  - *ad 1:* In God, the Word is not accidental but substantial, because in God being and intellection are the same.
- A.3. *Whether the name* Word *imports relation to creatures?*
  - The name *Word* implies a reference to creatures because in one act by which God knows Himself He also knows creatures, for there is only one intellection in God.
    - The one and only Word is expressive not only of the Father but of all creatures, and is also operative in reference to creatures.

On the image (q.35) [ch. 9]

- A.1 *Whether* image *in God is said personally?*
  - This question is raised in regard to Scriptural passages about the Son as being the image of the invisible God and His goodness (cf. Wisd 7:26; 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15; Heb 1:3).
  - The name *Image* is a personal and not essential name
    - For something to be a true image, it must proceed from another similar to itself in species or in the sign of the species; *that which implies procession or origin in God is personal.*
    - There are two conditions required for something to be a true image of another:
      1. that it be similar analogically, specifically, generically, and in the sign of the species.
      2. that tills likeness have its origin from that being of which it is the image by virtue of some procession.

IMAGE
- ARTIFICIAL (IMPERFECT) = similar only in the sign of the species (e.g., picture, statue)
- INTENTIONAL = expressed intelligible species implying a likeness in both the sign of the nature and in the specific nature itself.
- NATURAL (PERFECT) = denotes likeness in both specific nature and mode of natural being.

    - The natural image in God is the most perfect because it is likeness in nature numerically the same; the Word in God is at the same time the intentional and natural image.
- A.2. *Whether the name of* Image *is proper to the Son?*
  - Image as a name is proper to the Son:
    - *Scripturally,* the word image refers only properly to the Son.
    - *Theologically,* only the Son by reason of His procession formally possesses that which is similar to the Father because He proceeds as the expressed Word (whereas the Holy Ghost proceeds as love which is not a likeness but an inclination, although taken in the broad sense, He is the image of the Father and the Son).

On the person of the Holy Ghost (q.36) [ch. 10]

- A.1. *Whether the name* Holy Ghost *is the proper name of one divine Person?*
  - Although the name *Holy Ghost is* not in itself a proper name (but rather abstract), it has been adapted by its use throughout Holy Writ to designate the Third Person of the Trinity.
    - Proper names are given to those things pertaining to the intellect that are understood properly and distinctly; this is not the case with things pertaining to love (for the Holy Ghost is a procession of love):
      1. The intellect knows those things better that are of itself than those things that belong to another faculty, the will.
      2. God (the object of love) is not formally in the mind like truth, which is the conformity of judgment with a thing good is in things since the good is the very perfection of that thing which is amiable and alluring.
      3. Love, as inclining to the good which is in things, like every tendency or inclination, contains something potential, and things are not intelligible except so far as they are in act and are determined.

- Because of the ineffability of love, it follows that relations that arise from the procession of love are unnamed.

- The accommodative application of the abstract name *Holy Ghost* has two advantages:
  1. Since the Third Person proceeds from the first two Persons, who are spirits, this Person is also a spirit.
  2. The term *spirit in* corporeal things denotes a certain impulse and it is a property of love to impel or move the will of the lover to that which is loved.
- *ad 1: Spirit of God* is used throughout the Old Testament as a common name rather than a personal name; the aforementioned personal accommodation in the New Testament is obvious,
- *ad 2:* The name *Holy Ghost was* adopted to signify a person distinct from the others only by relation and as spirated by them.
- *ad 3:* It is appropriate to say *O iirHatheror Our Spirit but* not *Our Son* because no creature (man) can be considered the principle with regard to any of the divine Persons; we all are dependent upon our heavenly Father and Spirit can thus be used as a common name (although I would suggest avoiding this topic in the pulpit).

A.2. *Whether the Holy Ghostproceedsfrom the Son (the Filioque)?*

- St. Thomas observes that (above and beyond the authoritative declarations of Nicea, Lateran Iλτ, Florence, and Lyons II (cf. Denz. 83, 86, 277, 345, 428, 460, 703)) the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son.
  1. *Argumentfrom incongruity.* If the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from the Son, because the divine Persons are only distinguished by relation of origin, which is founded on the processions.
  2. *Argument based on the nature oftheprocessions'.* The Son proceeds after the manner of intellection as the Word, and the Holy Ghost proceeds after the manner of the will as personal love.
     - Love proceeds from the word, for we do not love anything unless we have apprehended it from the concept of the mind.
     - As nothing is willed unless it is first known, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son (and from the Father as well).
     - Furthermore, the subsistence of the divine Word elevates all the conditions of the Word to the most perfect being, and in this state of being, the Word actively and properly influences love; thus the Word of God spirates love.
  3. *Argumentfrom congruity.* When several things proceed from one, they are distinct only by number and matter, unless they are distinguished because of the orders of origin or causality.
     - However, the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from one and the same Father and they are distinct by more than number and matter, that is, by the two processions of the intellect and love which are more than numerically distinct.
     - Hence, there must be between them some order, not the order of causality· or of greater or lesser perfection (since every principle need not have a cause), but of origin; since the Son does not proceed from the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son (and the Father)
       - An order of greater or lesser perfection implies subordination, which is contrary· to the divine nature which each person possesses wholly.
       - An order of causality would contradict the fact that the three Persons are uncreated, uncaused, and equal.
       - Remaining is the order of origin, from which the relations derive and are distinguished.
  4. *Argumentfrom the generalprinciple that in God all things are one and the same except when then is opposition ofrelation:* No opposition of relation in active spiration exists between the Father and the Son and thus active spiration is common to both from which the Holy Ghost proceeds (cf. Florence, Denz. 703).
  5. *Argumentfrom our Ford's words in Jn 16:15 in reference to the Holy Ghost,* "All things that the Father hath are Mine; therefore I said that He shall receive of Mine": If the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, then the Son would not have whatsoever the Father has (except paternity).
  6. *Argumentfrom God's necessity ofbeing:* Since God is necessary, *in* being follows immediately on possibility since there is no difference between them (since God is Pure Act).
     - As it is the possibility that it appears that the Son should be the principle of the Holy Ghost, that which is from a principle in the first procession can be the principle in the second procession.
     - Thus the Son is the principle of the second procession together with the Father.

ad 1: Although Holy Writ does not say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son directly, the truth of it is still expressed, especially in Jn 16:14.

- *ad 2.* The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son is not mentioned in Constantinople I because the opposite error had not arisen yet; the Filioque was added to the Creed in response to the error and accepted by Lyons II and Florence.

- A.3. *Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?*
  - This article was written because the Greek Fathers and St. Hilary used the expression *through the Son.*
  - The Son has from the Father that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, in virtue of relation of origin.
  - *ad 1:* The Holy Ghost proceeds directly from the power of the Father because the spirative power in the Father and the Son is the same (it is one act of spiration) although there is an intermediate person.
  - *ad 4:* Incorrect to say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father since the Father does not receive from the Son that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him; however, the Father is not a more immediate principle by reason of His power since the power is identical in the Father and the Son.
- A.4. *Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?*
  - The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost since, as the Father and the Son are one in all things in which they are not distinguished by opposition of relation, they are not relatively opposed in their being the principle of the Holy Ghost.
  - *ad 1:* The term *Principle of the Holy Ghost* Spiratorri a substantive name; there is one principle and one spirator, although two spiraling beings.

On the name of the Holy Ghost as Love (q.37) [ch. 11]

- A.1. *Whether* Love *is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?*
  - *Fove,* if used personally and not essentially or notionally, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
    - *Proof from authority:* Although there is no specific appellation in Holy Writ, St. Augustine and St. Gregory (Pentecost Homilies 30) use the name *!.ore* to designate the Holy Ghost; this is in keeping with the Latin theory of the Trinity, according to which the Holy Ghost proceeds after the manner of love (cf. Toledo, Denz. 277).
    - *Theological proof.* Substantial love is accepted in three senses:
      1. *Fssentially,* it denotes the condition of the lover with reference to the thing loved and it belongs to the three Persons like intellection.
      2. *Notionally,* it signifies active spiration, by which the Holy Ghost is designated as proceeding from the Father and the Son.
      3. *Personally,* it denotes the condition of Him who proceeds after the manner of love with regard to His principle; in this sense is *Fore* the proper name of the Holy Ghost, proceeding from the mutual love of the Father and the Son.
  - The Holy Ghost is *not* the active spiration which is in the Father and the Son (this would mean that there are only two Persons); He is the *terminus of that spiration,* a terminus which is opposed to the first two divine Persons by the opposition of the relation of procession (or passive spiration).
  - *ad 2:* In God, love can be a divine person inasmuch as it is subsisting and also communicable as the terminus of the second procession.
  - *ad 3:* The Holy Ghost is the terminus of the mutual love of the l'ather and the Son inasmuch as He proceeds from two spirators, but the love of the two spirators is unique since there is only one spiration.
  - *ad 4:* The Holy Ghost loves with an essential love like the Father and Son.
- A.2. *Whether the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?*
  - The Father and Son love each other by the Holy Ghost with *notional Xove.* as a tree is said to flower with flowers.
    - If love is to be understood in the *essential sense,* then the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost but by the divine essence (in the one and same act of the divine will) because the Holy Ghost is *personal and not essential lave.*
    - *Notionally,* love is the spiration of the personal love just as enunciation is the producing of the word and flowering is the production of flowers; hence the Father and the Son are said to love themselves and creatures by the Holy Ghost, that is, proceeding love.
    - *Analogically,* parents love each other by their offspring since their offspring is the terminus of their love.
  - *ad 2:* Whenever the understanding of any action implies a determined effect, the principle of the action can be denominated by the action and the effect.
  - *ad 3:* The Holy Ghost not only proceeds from the mutual love of the Father and the Son but also from the love of the first goodness, which the Father loves in Himself and in the Son and which the Son loves in Himself and in the Father.

On the name of the Holy Ghost as Gift (q.38) [ch.12]

- A.1. *Whether* Gift *is a personal name?*
  - It is proper for a divine person to be given and to be a gift; an analysis of the concept of gift provides insight as to why:
    - The word *gpft* implies an aptitude to be given, an aptitude toward die giver and to him to whom the gift is made so that the receiver may really accept and enjoy the gift.
    - Any divine person can be given by another inasmuch as He proceeds from that person; further, a divine person may be possessed by a rational creature if the rational creature is given the ability to enjoy the divine person.
    - Hence, the name *Gift is* a personal name, belonging to a divine person to be given and to be a gift.
  - *ad* 3: *Gift* when used as a personal name in God does not imply subjection but only origin with regard to the giver; in comparison to the receiver, it implies free disposition (if the gift is inferior to the giver) or fruition (if the gift is a divine person).
  - *ad 4:* A divine person is called an eternal gift because of His aptitude to be given from eternity, although He is given in time; the name *Gift* does not imply a real relation to creatures but only a relation of reason.
- A.2. *Whether* Gift *is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?*
  - Gift taken personally in God is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
    - Since a gift implies a gratuitous donation based on love, the first thing that we give another is the love by which we will the good for him; thus love is the first gift and the root of all others.
    - The Holy Ghost proceeds as personal love; thus He proceeds as the first gift and, consequently, *Gift is* a personal name proper to Him and not the Father or the Son.
      - *Gift* taken in an *essential* sense belongs to all three divine Persons who are able to communicate and give themselves to us gratuitously.
        - Divine operations *ad extra (e.g. creation,* sanctification) are common to the three Persons because it proceeds from the omnipotent divine will, which as an attribute of the divine nature belongs to all three Persons; the designations Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier are predicated of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost respectively by appropriation.
      - Gift taken in the notional sense, according to its passive origin from the giver, refers to the Son, but less properly than the Holy Ghost which is personal love.

On the Persons in relation to the essence (q.39) [ch. 13]

- A.1 *Whether in God essence is the same as the person?*
  - In God, the persons are not really distinguished from the essence (cf. Ia q.28 a.2; q.29, a.4).
    - Relations inhere accidentally in creatures, but are substantial in God and identical with His essence; thus a divine Person (e.g., the Father) signifies a subsisting relation.
    - The divine persons are thus not really distinct from the divine essence although they are really distinct from each other because of opposition of relation.
  - *ad /*: The relations are not distinct by way of the divine essence (of which they are identical) but by way of relative opposition to each other.
  - *ad2:* The divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, and thus something can be affirmed of the essence which is denied of the persons (e.g., essence is communicable but paternity is not, just as mercy is the principle of forgiveness and justice is not).
- A.2. *Whether it must be said that the three Persons are of one essence?*
  - It is correct to say that the three Persons are of one essence *fhomoousios* – of one substance/consubstantial).
    - Divine things are denominated by way of our own intellectual processes, which constant reference to creatures from which we derive our concepts.
    - In creatures, essence signifies the form of individuals/persons and is thus attributed to them.
    - Likewise in God, where the persons are multiplied and essence is not, it is proper to say that the three Persons are of one essence, as the expression serves to signify the form.
  - *ad 5:* Improper to say that the persons are *out of(ex) the same essence,* since out of refers to the material and efficient cause (which does not exist in God), unlike *op the same essence* which refers to the formal cause.
- A.3. *Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three Persons?*
  - Distinction is to be made between the substantive and the adjective term.
    - Those things which signify the divine essence *substantively* are predicated of the divine persons singularly, not plural (e.g., one *God).*

- Those things which signify the divine essence adjectively are predicated of the three persons in the plural (e.g., *three wise beings).*

- *ad 3* That which pertains to a relation is predicated in the plural; that which refers to substance is predicated in the singular.

A.4. *Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?*

- *God* in the concrete signifies the divine nature in the supposit and therefore *God* may express either the principle of operation common to the three Persons (e.g., *God created the heavens and the earthi)* or one of the three Persons.
- The particular signification must be determined by the predicate; thus when it is said that *G>od created, God* refers to the three Persons, whereas *Godgenerates* refers to the Father alone because generation is proper only to Him.

A.5. *Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?*

- Although the divine nature is God without any real distinction, it is improper to say *the diiine nature generates,* because its formal signification is not the same as *Godgenerates.*
  - *Divine nature* signifies the divine essence in itself, but *God* signifies the divine essence in the supposit, and it is by reason of the supposit that, given the example here, *God* can be said to generate, since *G>od* can be substituted with *Father.*
  - Hence, essential terms such as *Deity, divine nature,* and the like taken in the abstract (thus referring to essence) cannot be substituted for person.

A.6. *Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?*

- Personal substantive names like *Father* can be predicated of the divine essence because of the *real identity* of the essence and the person; hence it is proper to sav that the Father is God, the Son is God, etc.
- Improper to say that the divine essence is unbegotten, or is begotten, etc., because these are adjectival names which are attributed to persons but not all three persons commonly.

A.7. *Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?*

- For the manifestation of the Faith, it is fitting that essential attributes be appropriated to the persons.
  - St. Paul characterizes Christ as the *power of God* or *the wisdom of God* (1 Cor 1:24); although wisdom is common to the three persons, it is appropriated to the Son.
  - The Trinity of persons cannot be demonstrated, but can be fittingly explained by such truths which are clearer to us.
    - As essential attributes, known to us from creatures, are more clear to us than the properties of the three Persons, it is fitting that the essential attributes be appropriated to the persons, especially when there is a similarity or affinity, e.g., wisdom as appropriated to the Son.
- *ad 1:* Properties can be easily distinguished from appropriations.
  - Properties pertain *to those things attributable to one person but not to another* (e.g., Unbegottenness is a property of the Father).
  - Appropriations *are those things which of themselves are common to the three persons but for greater clarity are attributed to one person.*
- *ad 2:* To be appropriated does not signify becoming a property; although wisdom is appropriated of the Son, it is not said that the Father is wise on account of the wisdom He generates, but by the wisdom which is His essence.
- *ad 3:* An essential attribute like *wisdom* is in itself prior to a person, but as appropriated follows upon the property of a person (e.g., the Son as the Word from the Father is appropriately called *wisdom).*

A.8. *Whether the essential attributes are appropriated in a fitting manner by the holy Doctors?*

- Appropriations made by the Scriptures and Fathers present no difficulties when considered rightly:
  - *God as He is a being* (St. Hilary): **Father = eternity,** because eternal is not from a principle; **Son = brightness,** because He is perfect image and splendor of the Father; **Holy Ghost = fruition,** because the Father and Son mutually love each other and mutually enjoy the Holy Ghost.
  - *God as He is one* (St. Augustine): **Father = unity,** because absolutely unity does not imply anything else; **Son = equality,** because equality implies unity with reference to another; **Holy Ghost = concord,** because concord implies unity of two according to the heart.
  - *God as He has the power of operation* (St. Augustine): **Father = power,** because power has a nature of a principle; **Son = wisdom,** because the Son is the word or concept of wisdom; **Holy Ghost = goodness,** because goodness is the basis and object of love and He proceeds after the manner of love.
  - *As God has a relationship to His effects* (Rom 11:36): **Father = efficient cause (of/ ex),** belonging to Him because of His omnipotence; **Son = form (by/ per)** by which agent acts; **Holy Ghost = condition of container (in),** as God conserves things in His goodness.

On the Persons as compared to the relations or properties (q.40) [ch.14]

A.1. *Whether relation is the same as personi*

- An incommunicable relation as subsisting is the same as a person, which is something subsisting and incommunicable.
- *ad 1:* Personal properties (e.g, paternity, filiation) are not really distinct from the persons because as God and Deity are the same, so the Father and paternity are the same.
  - Properties which are not personal (e.g, active spiration) are not really distinct from the persons to whom they are attributed, because the simplicity of God excludes every real distinction except where there is opposition of relation.

A.2. *Whether the persons are distinguished bp the relations? (cf. q.30)*

- Persons are distinguished by relation and are not constituted by active or passive origin, as Alexander of Hales thought (attributed to St. Bonaventure).
  - Person is constituted by something intrinsic to the person itself that is stable and permanent in actual being.
  - Active and passive origins are extrinsic to the persons; for example, active origin, like active generation, cannot*formally* constitute the person which it presupposes, since it is the Father who generates.
  - Thus the divine Persons are constituted by subsisting relations, as the Father signifies the First Person, and the generation is the property of the Person.

A.4. *Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?*

- Notional acts taken actively (to generate/spirate) presuppose the persons from which they proceed as already constituted by the subsisting relations; hence active generation (enunciation) proceeds from the divine intellect as modified by the relation of paternity.
  - Simply, there is a person from which we have the act; it is not from having an act from which we have a person.
- A relations (e.g. paternity) as a relation actually referring to the Son presupposes active generation; but active generation presupposes the person who generates and the personal property, paternity, as constituting a person.
  - This is part of the mystery of the Trinity of which can be explained no further, although obviously not contradictory.
- *ad 1:* Both statements are true: *because He generates, He is the Father* and *because He is the Father, He generates.*
  - The first considers *Father* as taking the relation alone (or simple reference to the terminus, the Son); the second considers *Father* as a subsisting person.

On the persons in reference to the notional acts (q.41) [ch. 15]

- A.1. *Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?*
  - Notional acts are so-called because these denote persons; thus they are to be attributed to the persons, and is necessary to do so in order to signify the order of origin in the different persons.
    - Scripture supports this clearly, especially Jn 15:26, *Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father,* and Jn 8:42, *For from God, I proceeded and I came.*
    - Furthermore, as in the divine Persons, distinction is based on relation of origin which must be conveniently designated to some act; so generation is properly attributed to the Father and active spiration to the Father and the Son.
  - *ad 1:* Notional acts, like generation and spiration, pertain to the person rather than the divine essence since these are acts *ad intra* belonging to the procession of a person from a person.
  - *ad 2.* Since there is no motion in God *(ad intra),* action in God implies nothing more that the order of origin, according to which it proceeds from the principle to the terminus.
    - Hence, active generation is nothing else than the condition or reference of the Father to the Son, and active spiration is nothing else than the reference of the Father and Son to the Holy Ghost.
  - *ad 3:* Imperfection could be attributed to God only if passive generation implied motion; this is not the case since there is no motion in God.

    Action in God implies order of origin; thus it is said that the Father generates and the Son is generated, not meaning however that the Son is generated by a transition from passive potency to act (like in the created order), *but in the sense that the entire uncreated divine nature, subsisting and unreceived being itself is communicated to the Son by the Father.*

    Thus in God, to be generated (or spirated) is not less perfect than to generate or spirate, since it is the simple perfect divine nature that is being communicated (not *caused?).*

A.2. *Whether the notional acts are voluntary?*

- The question boils down as to whether the Father voluntarily generates the Son and whether the Father and Son voluntarily spirate the Holy Ghost; St. Augustine says that *the Father generates the Son neither by will nor by necessity* (cf. *Ad Orosium* q.7).

WILL
- ANTECEDENT (as effective principle)
  - AS NATURE (natural and necessary principle); e.g.. man wills happiness in general.
  - AS FREE (principle acting indifferently as to a judgment); e.g., God freely wills creatures.
- CONCOMITANT e.g., Peter is man. but the fact that he is a man does not depend on his will.

  - God's notional acts (generation and spiration) are *voluntary by a concomitant wilt,* the Father voluntarily generates the Son, just as He wills Himself to be God.
  - God's notional acts are *not voluntary by antecedent will as free,* because what proceeds from the free will in this way has potential not to be, which is impossible in reference to the Son and Holy Ghost who are not creatures.
  - Active spiration is *by an antecedent will by nature* (since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which is from the will, the terminus of that volition by which the Father and the Son naturally and necessarily love each other; this is similar to the way the blessed love God by an act of the will which is spontaneous and necessary, an act above liberty because it is invincible drawn to God's goodness by vision of His essence); generation proceeds from the intellect (not the will) and is thus prior to the will.

A.3. *Whether the notional acts proceed from something?*

- This article counters the Arian position that the Son is a creature, being made from nothing.
- Generation and spiration are emanations and not creations from nothing.
  - Difference being begotten and being made is the fact that he who is begotten is from the substance of the generation:
    - In humans, the son is from the seed of the father, although there is a multiplication of natures.
    - In God, the Son is of the substance of the Father, *but the entire indivisible divine nature is communicated to the Son without multiplication of nature',* thus the Son is begotten and not made in any sense.

A.4. *Whether in God there is a power in respect to the notional acts?*

- The power of generating is not properly the principle of active generation but the principle of the begotten person; similarly, the power of spirating is not the principle of active spiration, but the principle of the spirated person.
  - The notional powers of generation and spiration are not distinct virtually from the acts of generation and spiration since God Himself is pure Act and there is no potency in Him.
  - Thus in God, His intellect is intellection subsisting *per se* and His will is His act of love by which He love Himself necessarily and others freely.

A.5. *Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation and not the essence?*

- The power of generating signifies the divine nature directly and the relation of paternity indirectly.
  - The proximate principle *quo* (by which) of the processions is the divine nature itself as modified by the relations of paternity and spiration.
    - An analogy can be drawn from the created order, in that every nature generates its own (unless you are eugenicist); e.g, Wilber as a man generates a man; Wilber does not generate another Wilber or else he would generate himself, which is absurd.
  - Thus in God, the relation of paternity constitutes the person of the Father who generates, but it does not constitute that by which *(quo)* the Father generates, which is the divine nature.

A.6. *Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?*

- This question amounts to whether several persons can be generated or spirated in God, as a man can beget several sons; this is impossible:
  - Being and possibility are not different *in God* since He is pure Act; thus if several persons could be generated of God, there would be; this is opposed to Revelation and is heretical.
  - Plurality of generations is a property of matter or would presuppose numerically distinct generations, neither which is befitting God.

Generation and spiration are acts naturally determined to one terminus which is wholly adequate and perfect; since the form of one species is only multiplied in matter, a form not received in matter cannot be anything but one.

On the equality and likeness among the divine Persons (q.42) [ch.16]

- A.1. *Whether then is equality in God?*
  - Things are said to be unequal according to a difference in quantity; however in God, quantity is the perfection of the divine nature which s numerically identical with the three divine Persons.
  - Thus the three Persons are not unequal, but all three are coequal.
  - *ad 1*: Quantity is predicated either of amount or power, and in the second sense quantity is said of God, predicated according to the perfection of nature.
    - To be one in nature is to be the same; to be one in quantity is to be equal, and to be one in quality is to be similar.
  - *ad 2:* The three Persons are similar due to equality of power.
- A.2. *Whether the person proceeding is coeternal nith His principle, as the Son with the Father?*
  - The proceeding persons are coetemal with their principles because they proceed from a principle whose active power is always perfect by instantaneous action in the one unique instant of eternity.
    - Since God's intellect and will are always in act, the divine intellect is never without the Word nor the divine will never wirhout personal love, the Holy Ghost.
  - *ad 2:* Unparticipated eternity (as predicated of the divine Persons) properly excludes the principle of *duration* but not *origpn·,* hence the Son originates from the Father in the one instant of immoveable eternity (perpetual *now).*
  - *ad 3·.* The Son, although generated, does not begin to be since divine generation does not entail a change from non-being to being, but takes place by a communication of uncreated Being itself in its entirety; hence the Son is always generated (complete perfect action) and the Father always generates in the perpetual *now* of eternity.
  - *ad 4:* The Son is *always bom* since such designation signifies the perfection of Him who is begotten (as opposed to *being born* which connotes some kind of potency).
- A.3. *Whether in the divine Persons there exists an order of nature?*
  - An order of nature exists in the divine Persons according to origin, not according to priority.
    - A plurality of persons in God without order would imply confusion in God, which is impossible.
    - Order is always predicated with regard to some principle; as already shown, principle without origin is predicable of God, which is the basis for the ordering in Him.
  - *ad 2:* Whatever is posterior to another in nature must depend according to its own nature upon the nature of the other; this cannot apply to God since there is only one nature.
    - The relations in God are subsisting persons in one nature and thus one person is not prior to another either on the part of the nature or on the part of the relation.
  - *ad 3:* The order of nature is predicated not in the sense that the divine nature itself is ordered but that the order among the divine Persons follows according to natural origin.
  - *ad 4:* It is called *order of nature* instead of *order of essence* since the term *nature* implies the idea of principle unlike the term *essence.*

\. I. *Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?*

- The Son is equal to the Father in perfection, in virtue of the entirety of the divine nature communicated to Him.
  - The Son by generation attains to the possession of the perfect nature which is in the Father as it is possessed by the Father; this possession must be perfect because there is no defect in generation, which is also eternal.
- *ad 1*: Only as man did Christ say *The Father is greater than I.*
- *ad 2:* Divine generation entails a communication of uncreated Being itself; the fact that the Son is generated does not make Him less than the Father.
  - Relations possess only that by which it has reference to something; thus the same dignity which is paternity in the Father (the divine essence) is filiation in the Son.
  - In other words, in the Father the dignity of the divine essence is according to the relation of the giver, and in the Son according to the relation of the recipient.
- *ad 3:* The three divine Persons together do not constitute greater perfection than one person alone, because the divine nature is wholly possessed by each person.

A.5. *Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?*

- *Circumincession* signifies consubstantiality, the immanence of the processions, and the reciprocity of the opposing relations; thus it can be said that *the Son is in the Father* and *the Father is in the Son:*

        - *According to essence,* which is numerically identical in the Persons.
        - *According to relation,* since they mutually involve each other, although they are in opposition.
        - *According to procession,* which is *ad intra.*
- A.6. *Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power? (in response to Jn 5:19)*
    - The Son is equal to the Father in power since the power of acting follows the perfection of the nature, which is numerically the same in the Father and in the Son.
    - *ad 1:* The Son possesses this power in the same way He possesses His nature from the Father.

On the mission of the divine Persons (q.43) [ch.17]

- A.1. *Whether a divine Person can be properly sent?*
    - The idea of mission implies a twofold reference of the one sent: to the sender and to the terminus of the sending.
        - One can be sent by the sender by way of origin (e.g., flower sent out by the plant); one is sent to the terminus of the sending in the sense that the one sent begins to be there or at least begins to be there in a new way.
        - A divine mission is defined as the procession of origin of one person from another with a new mode of existence in another.
        - With this in mind, a mission can be predicated of a divine Person by way of a proper analogy inasmuch as the divine Person proceeds from the sender and begins to be in another in a new way.
            - Hence in regard to the Son, for example, He is sent into the world by the Father in the flesh assumed by Him, although the Son was in the world before this as the Word not yet Incarnate.
    - *ad 1:* The one sent is not less than the sender if He is sent according to a procession by way of origin, since this takes place on the plane of equality.
    - *ad 2:* In a divine mission, the one sent is not separated from the sender because there is no local movement to a place one has not been before, but only *the beginning of a new manner of being* in a place one has not been before.
        - Divine missions are more than a simple appropriation; the Son is Incarnate properly and personally so that the Father and the Holy Ghost are not incarnate.
- A.2. *Whether mission is eternal or only temporal?*
    - Mission in God is predicated only temporarily.
        - A mission, besides the reference to an eternal principle, has a reference to a temporal terminus by which the idea of mission is completed.
        - Hence, although the principle is eternal, the mission is said to be temporal because the effect the mission connotes and by which is denominated is temporal.
    - *ad 2'.* The Word is not changed by the visible mission of the Incarnation due to the fact that the humanity of Christ terminates in the word (and not vice-versa).
    - *ad 3:* Mission includes the eternal procession and adds a temporal effect; thus there is a twofold procession with respect to the two termini, of which one is eternal (the eternal procession itself) and the other temporal (which is the mission).
        - The divine mission essentially implies being sent by way of origin, and therefore it is not only the temporal operation of God *ad extra,* but the eternal origin of the person sent with the connotation of the operation ad extra and the temporal effect.
- A.3. *Whether the invisible mission of the divine Person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?*
    - Visible and invisible missions differ according to the kind of terminus or the temporal effect connoted by the mission.
        - *Visible mission* connotes an effect that is at least in some way sensible, by which the person sent is sensibly manifested (e.g., the Word Incarnate, the Holy Ghost on Pentecost).
        - *Invisible mission* connotes an effect of the spiritual order and which is not sensible (e.g., the Holy Ghost sent to the soul of a just man, accomplished by infused habitual grace).
    - As stated, a divine Person is sent inasmuch as He exists in a new way in another and is possessed in another.
        - Although a divine Person is present in all things in an ordinary way (the efficient cause of creation), He becomes present in man in a new way when He is known and loved by man, by an operation which takes place by way of habitual grace and charity.
        - This demonstrates that a divine Person is sent invisibly according to grace *gratum faciens,* which is connected with charity.
            - Thus, this invisible sending of a divine Person requires more than just a natural knowledge of God, but that knowledge which is received from some gift appropriate to the Person, that is, from the gift by which the conjunction with God is effected in us.

- A.4. *Whether the Father can befittingly sent?*
  - It is not congruous for the Father to be sent, since mission implies procession from another according to origin; as the Father is not from another. He is not sent.
  - *ad 1:* The Father gives Himself inasmuch as He liberally communicates Himself to be enjoyed by creatures and He dwells in creatures by grace, (cf. Jn 14:23)
- A.5. *Whether it isfittingfor the Son to be sent invisibly?*
  - The Son was sent visibly by the Incarnation, but He is also sent invisibly, for He said *W? will come to him and make our abode in him* Qn 14:23); thus He is sent invisibly according to the gift of grace *gratumfaciens.*
  - *ad 1:* Certain gifts pertain to the Son, specifically those pertaining to the intellect and incline to love (e.g., wisdom).
- A.6. *Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate in grace?*
  - Since the invisible mission takes place through sanctifying grace, it affects all who participate in grace.
  - *ad 1:* The Holy Trinity dwelt in the fathers of the Old Testament by the fact that they were in a state of grace, and the Son and the Holy Ghost were invisibly sent to them.
  - *ad 2:* Invisible mission takes place in the progress of virtue or in the increase of grace; it takes place also after the passive purification of the senses which is the movement from the purgative to the illuminative wav.
  - *ad 3:.* The Holy Ghost is sent to the blessed at the exact moment when the Beatific Vision begins.
  - *ad 4* A mission of a divine Person takes place by the reception of the Sacraments only to those who are disposed to receive grace by a faithful and worthy reception.
- A.7. *Whether it isfittingfor the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?*
  - The visible sending of the Holy Ghost at Christ's Baptism and on Pentecost is fitting because it is connatural to man to be led by visible things to the invisible.
    - The difference between the two visible missions of the Son and Holy Ghost is that the Son is sent as the *principle ofsanctification* (and therefore as a divine Person united to a human nature to perform a work as a Redeemer) and the Holy Ghost as the *sign ofsanctification.*
  - *ad* 2: The visible manifestation of the Holy Ghost was something real and extra-mental, since all the witnesses present saw Him with their bodily eyes.
  - *ad 5:.* The dove and the fire was formed externally by the ministry of the angels.
  - *ad 6:.* The different and frequent visible missions of the Holy Ghost in the early Church was to advance the propagation of the faith.
- A.8. *Whether a divine Person is sent only by theperson whence Heproceeds eternally?*
  - Properly speaking, a divine Person is sent by that person from whom He proceeds; thus the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son and the Son is sent by the Father.
  - In a less proper sense, it can be said that the Son is sent by the Holy Ghost inasmuch as the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect of which the mission takes place; hence we say in the Creed: *He was incarnate by the Holy Ghost ofthe Virgin Mary and was made man.*

A Recapitulation of the Importance of the Mystery of the Trinity

- The distinction between the two orders of nature and grace appears more clearly from the fact that mystery of the Trinity is entirely indemonstrable.
- The mystery shows that the intimate life of God is the perfect life of intellection and of love.
- In the revelation of the Blessed Trinity, the intimate life of God appears as the supreme exemplar of the life of grace, especially since man's adoptive filiation is an analogical participation in the eternal natural filiation.
- There would be no other way to explain the satisfaction Christ made on the Cross for sin if God was not triune.

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Nisi Oominus aedificaverit domum, in vanum laboraverunt qui aedificant eum.

Sit nomen Homini benedictum in saecula. Arnen